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ABSTRACT. We propose a new type of semantic memory, called thread memory.
The primitives of this memory are threads, defined as keyed multilink,
loop-free chains, which link semantic nodes. All links run from
superordinate categories to subordinate categories. This is the opposite
direction to those in the usual tree structure in that brother nodes in the
tree share the structure above their common ancestors. The most valuable
feature of the thread memory is its capacity to learn. A program which can
learn concepts using as data children's primer books, was written by R.
Greenblatt and runs on the LISP-MACHINE at the MIT-AI Laboratory. We have
considered the thread memory as working hypothesis for exploring the
mechanisms of naming deficits in aphasia and the ways of rehabilitation.
A. I. Laboratory Working Papers are produced for internal circulation,
and may contain information that is, for example, too preliminary or too
detailed for formal publication. Although some will be given a limited
external distribution, it is not intended that they should be considered
papers to which reference can be made in the literature.
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INTRODUCTION
Memory is concerned with how knowledge is stored, cross-referenced,
indexed, retrieved, accumulated and modified. The elements of memory are
concepts. Concepts form hierarchies leading to more complicated concepts.
The way knowledge is arranged determines how we understand, solve problems,
remember, and learn.
In this paper we are interested in implementing a semantic memory,
so we propose a conceptual structure and a set of mechanisms which operate
on it. We provide a computer simulation in the form of a program written
in LISP. We introduce a novel "memory" structure that will be called
"thread memory" for reasons that will became clear; its structure was
motivated partly by empirical results from psychological experiments,
testing, and observations made in less structured situations. We also used
ideas suggested by clinical information about how damaged memory mechanisms
breaks down in cases of aphasia and agnosia.
We begin with a very condensed exposition of our position with
respect to "fundamental principles". In our view, the initial sources of
concepts are the perceptual systems, such as language, vision, touch, etc.
Different kinds of concepts are initially treated in their own ways, but
eventually -- at some level of representation -- all information conveyed
by the perceptual systems is supposed to become compatible; this level is
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called the conceptual structure and it constitutes the "working space" of
memory. In addition the conceptual structure memory has a set of
mechanisms which process the information represented in the concepts.
We do not want to pretend to solve all problems in this one paper. So
we will accept, as a working position, the view proposed by many natural
language processing researchers that semantic structure -- the
representation of information conveyed by language perception -- is
embedded in such a conceptual structure, which determines much of how we
organize our human experience. This hypothesis says that how we learn to
represent and to deal with the world has very little to do with how we
learn the language per se. Still, language learning is important in world-
learning since, besides the "universal" linguistic aspects of syntax,
phonology, and projection rules, etc., there are large non-universal parts,
e.g., in the lexicon and in non-universal parts of the syntax.[lO]
There are several general criteria which are applied in the evaluation
of any theoretical model: for example, the criteria of economy,
efficiency, universality, reliability, etc. -We claim that the application
of these criteria should be purpose-related: for example, our proposed
thread memory might be considered too redundant and wasteful of storage
space. However, this may make it more resistant to damage and decay. A
memory that satisfies. perfectly some criteria of universality might turn
out to he unrealistic and uninteresting if it told us only generalities and
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little about how to process the particular experiences of the individual.
In the view we take, the most important aspect of semantic memory
organization is how effectively it can be made to "learn". We believe that
'thread memory' provides a better base for a learning system than others
like those of (Fahlman [8], Brachman [7]). We intend to show the evidence
for this claim in several ways.
We take human memory as our model for a learning system. However the
usual tools of experiment and introspection applied to the human memory
system are quite untrustworthy. We believe that the study of how brain
damage disrupts the use of language provides a more reliable tool. Indeed,
the most direct motivation for the details of our 'thread memory' comes
from Warrington's analysis of three cases of visual agnosia[25].
Perhaps the most important feature required of a memory good for
sophisticated learning is the avoidance of local conventions with global
consequences. That is, one wants to be able to add information on the
basis of considerations whose scope is very local to the specific
information item to be added. For example, one should have to be concerned
only with the goal context at the moment the addition is made; one should
not have to worry about all sorts of possible future unrelated tasks. We
shall illustrate this principle, and show how our proposed memory
or(janization supports it, both in structure and in application,
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The best evidence for such a proposal is a working computer program;
this is the only convincing way to show that a theory of learning is
effective, complete, and applicable -- not to mention its practical
utility. Even more important -- during the construction of the theory --
is the way that the practicalities of a computer program continually direct
one's attention to points which otherwise might well be glossed over. Such
points frequently form the basis for new advances in conceptualization.
More metaphysically, it is our view that because both computer programs
and humans are computational elements governed by universal laws, one would
expect them to develop in somewhat similar directions -- even without any
explicit attempt to make this happen. Although there are surely profound
structural differences between the brain and the present-day computer, the
computer system designer, working Within his paradigms of practicality,
efficiency, and elegance,, may be driven to similar solutions as was
nature's human cognitive development. In any case, there is little to lose
in believing this, until we are flooded with too many, too adequate
theories!
Lucia Vaina
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Thread Memory. and the Semantic Interpreter SEMI (note 1)
Threads are a new generic data organization [9] which seems to have great
potential for computer concept construction. In this section, we describe
the basic idea and point out some of its basic computational properties.
A thread is a keyed multi-link loop-free chain, which links semantic
nodes. A typical thread might be
mallard -> living -> animal -> bird -> duck -> species-of-duck.
In this notation, the first token (called the key) is not actually
stored as part of the thread. Instead, it represents the stimulus by which
the rest of the thread may be accessed. The links running from node to
node are entirely unique to the particular key; the same nodes could be
linked by other threads in either the same or different fashion since those
other threads would have different keys. (We actually provide a mechanism
whereby a single thread can link the same nodes in more that one fashion
simultaneously. However, we defer discussion of this latter mechanism for
the moment.)
Note that all links run from superordinate categories to subordinate
categories [25 ]. In other words, all access paths run from more general
categories to more specific categories. This is the opposite direction to
those in the usual tree structure, where brother nodes in the tree share
the structure above their common ancestor.
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Representing Threads on the Computer
We introduce a single node, called the SEMI-ROOT. All threads originate
at the SEMI-ROOT. Thus, given a key (mallard, for example), we reference
(mallard, SEMI-ROOT), to obtain 'living'. If we next reference (mallard,
living) we obtain animal, and so on. For reasons which will become
evident, we require all normal threads to end back on their keys. Thus the
example becomes
mallard -> SEMI-ROOT -> living -> animal -> bird -)
-- > duck -) species-of-duck -> mallard.
Remarks
Thread memory seems to make information "come out" in the "right order".
What could be more sensible, when first thinking of mallard, than to
retrieve living, its most general classification? If that doesn't give us
the cue we want, we next try animal, etc. The memory seems suited to
certain recognition tasks. Suppose we see a duck we think might be a
mallard. By retrieving on mallard we can not only obtain information to
help verify this guess, but also obtain a large amount of correct
information in case the duck we saw turns out to be a red crested
saddleback. Even if it turns out we saw a sea gull, we may well get large
amounts of useful data by retreving on mallard. Furthermore, if we do
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decide that it's a sea gull, it is easy to determine if we have made use of
any incorrect information about mallards. (Namely any information beyond
the fork point). (The same kind of property was used by Marr and Nishihara
[14] for object recognition).
The problems of dynamically adding to this sort of data base are
considerably simplified. We see that simply adding a new item to the data
base involves no modification at all of any previously existing links.
This greatly reduces the necessity to "understand" the database when
updating it, a very desirable property. Additionally, this property may
simplify the implementation of "contexts". At least, the behavior of the
data base prior to some addition can be simulated by a simple operation
performed on the results returned by the data base after the addition.
The data base is ideally suited to answering "compare and contrast"
questions. Given mallard and elephant, one immediately has (for example)
"they are both living, and both animals, but a mallard is a bird while an
elephant is a mammal". We have come to call this operation on two threads
"finding the fork point", and we believe it has great importance.
)eductioii ii a thread miemnory system
Suppose we have
- > ELEPHANT -> ANIMAL -> ELEPHANT
-> ANIMAL -> LIVING-THING -> ANIMAl..
We are asked "Is ELEPHANT a LIVING-THING?" The necessary one step
deduction is performed by searching each thread whose semantic node is on
Lucia Vaina
Version of September 5, 1979 9 Lucia Vaina
the ELEPHANT thread, for the node LIVING-THING. After the appropriate
intermediate node ANIMAL is found, one can perform an interesting operation
called "assimilating" the deduction. This consists of inserting the goal
node on the original thread in the position immediately before the
intermediate node, obtaining, for example,
ELEPHANT -> I.IVING-THING -> ANIMAL -> ELEPHANT.
Note that the general to specific nature of the thread is
preserved. If the same inquiry is repeated, the answer will now be
immediately available. In other words, the assimilating process turns what
was a one step deduction into a zero step deduction, and by induction, can
turn an N step deduction into a zero step deduction, provided the system is
asked the appropriate "leading" questions. However, it would be quite
tedious if one were required go through this "leading" process each time.
This can be avoided in a natural fashion by "building up" on an
intermediate node. Suppose we also have
LIVING-THING -> PHYSICAL-OBJECT -> LIVING-THING.
If we ask once "Is an ANIMAL a PHYSICAL-OBJECT"?, obtaining - >
ANIMAL -> PHYSICAL-OBJECT -. LIVING-THING -> ANIMAL, then henceforth we can
show that any ANIMAL is a PHYSICAL-OBJECT using only a one step deduction.
In other words, with the same assimilation mechanism we can easily
chain together intermediate deduction steps so that the entire chain is
available as a single deduction step. Thus the depth of deduction required
is no longer the "distance" between the two nodes, but instead the number
of "jumps" between "corridors" (or deduction chains) that are required
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[23]. Motion "along" a corridor comes for free.
To look at it in another way, such corridors in effect form a
"chart", which can greatly reduce the danger of combinatorial explosion.
Visualize a search space as originating at a point and consisting of a
wedge shaped space of possibilites expanding off to the distance. Then the
corridors correspond to particular line segments within the wedge, some
touching the origin and some not. Doing a depth N search can be visualized
as searching the rectangle N wide centered on each corridor which touches
the origin, plus a rectangle N-D wide centered on any corridor which passes
through one of those rectangles with a distance D of closest approach to
the generating corridor, and so on, until N is reduced to 0. With
appropriate corridors in place, very modest search depths such as one or
two can find solutions to non-trivial problems.
As such a memory structure is filled out, one can see that there is
quite a bit of redundancy. This would seem to be a very desirable property
when building a system out of unreliable elements. In addition, such
redundancy can lead to a very simple model of forgetting. One can simply
delete nodes at random at a low rate. If the relevant thread is in use,
the deleted node will be rederived, otherwise, it will remain "forgotten".
From the point of view of economy of storage elements, the general-
to-specific method is not as economical as the specific-to-general method,
where brothers in the tree share links above the point in the tree where
the brothers merge. However, this loss of economy is minimized if, as we
believe, the semantic tree is shallow and bushy.
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One problem that becomes evident is that it is frequently desired
to have a node participate in several independent hierarchies, such as
BOY -> PERSON -) MALE -> BOY and
BOY -> PERSON -> CHILD -> BOY
We simply allow this, and term the collection the general thread of
BOY. An individual path is referred to as a simple thread. Most
operations are performed upon simple threads, so, the issue of selecting
simple threads arises. We postulate a mechanism called "general context"
to deal with this problem, which is briefly discussed in the section of
aplications (for more detail see (9]). We also retain, as a medium cost
operation, the ability to "map" over all simple threads of a general
thread, if desired.
There are some facts we wish to store about nodes which may not
lend themselves to a hierarchical representation. To help deal with this,
we postulate property lists of semantical nodes which act in a fashion
similar to LISP property lists. The property lists associate attributes
with symbols. Property lists have an even number of elements, and in each
pair of elements the first element is a symbol called indicator, and the
second is the value. The indicator serves as the name of the property and
the value as the value of the property. Thus, a thread can be associated
with a property of a node. The retrevial operation operates on an entire
simple thread, not only on a single node. Thus, for example, we might
retrieve the property COLOR-OF from. the thread
CLYDE -> LIVING-THING -> ANIMAL -> ELEPHANT -> CLYDE. Thus, a single
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property stored on ELEPHANT, would be sufficient to say all elephants are
GREY. We notate such a thread by
(ELEPHANT COLOR-OF) -> GREY
where the property's indicator is COLOR-OF, and its value is the key of
the desired thread. (In the implementation, the system generates this key
internally from a sequence such as 60001, 60002, etc.)
Performing property retrieval operations threadwise helps "chunk"
information in many cases. For example, suppose we encounter BERTHA, the
blue elephant. We then retrieve COLOR-OF from the thread
BERTHA -> LIVING-THING -) ANIMAL -) ELEPHANT -> BERTHA.
The retrieval operation would return ((ELEPHANT GREY) (BERTHA
BLUE)) which would give a tipoff that BERTHA is a special elephant. By
retrieving both facts in a single step, we insure that both are taken into
consideration and avoid bad logic based on only one of them in ignorance of
the other.
The existence of certain property threads can be specially built
into the system. An example is the IS-NOT-A thread. Storing ANIMAL on the
IS-NOT-A thread of PLANT, for example, will enable us to distinguish all
PLANTs from all animals and ANIMALs from all plants by means of a single
thread operation.
Distinguishing an arbitrary PLANT from an arbitrary ANIMAL is
somewhat. more interesting. Without heuristics, four nested loops would be
required, but by using the "finding the fork point" heuristic, only two
nested loops are required. The outer two loops are the same in either
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case, namely FOR-EACH simple thread of CLYDE, FOR-EACH simple thread of
DAISY. The straightforward approach would then have use loop over each
node in the simple thread of CLYDE and for each of them loop over each node
in the simple thread of DAISY, looking for a contradiction. In many cases,
this computation can be greatly shortened by the finding the fork point of
the two threads. It is clear that any nodes before the fork point are the
same on both threads and so cannot cause a contradiction. Once the fork
point is reached, there is an excellent possibility that the two forking
nodes are the desired contradiction. If we have, for example:
DAISY -> LIVING-THING -> PLANT -> DAISY
CLYDE -> LIVING-THING -> ANIMAL -> ELEPHANT -> CLYDE.
the fork point is exactly the desired contradiction. In current practice,
the computer program examines althogether four possibilites to allow for
possible "mismatch" in the degree to which the threads are "built up".
That is, in addition to looking for a contradiction on the thread TI(n) vs
T2(n) (which is the fork point itself), we also test TI(n+l) with T2(n),
Tl(n+1) with T2(n+l), and TI(n) with T2(n+l). Additionally, we test if
TI(n+l) is equal to T2(n) or vice-versa. If so, a false fork point has
been found, the odd node is-discarded, and the search for the true fork
point is resumed. When these procedures are exhausted, the threads are
assumed non-contradictory without examining further subordinate categories
for possible contradictions.
The individually keyed nature of threads helps control the damage
which may occ:ur in case that inconsistent data should be stored in the
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memory. Suppose, for example, we have said that (IS-NOT-A PLANT ANIMAL)
then encounter an EUGLENA which is both a PLANT and an ANIMAL. We observe
that there is no way the system's reasoning about other plants and animals
can become confused, since the contradictory information is confined to the
EULFLENA thread, which is completely inactive unless EUGLENAs are under
consideration. Even with reference to EUGLENAs, reasonable things will
happen. The EUGLENA will inherit the properties of both PLANTS and
ANIMALS. Nothing "gross" can happen in areas of knowledge remote from the
contradiction. If the system is quizzed on the contradiction itself, by
(IS-? ANIMAL EUIGLENA) it will say yes, and it will also say yes to (IS-?
PLANT EUGLENA). This is because it looks first in the IS-A heirarchy (for
a possible yes answer) before it looks for IS-NOT-A property threads (for a
possible no answer).
Another sense in which thread memory deals with the internal difficulties
caused by inconsistent data concerns controlling the depth of deduction.
Deep deduction is undesirable because it is likely to expose
inconsistencies, and it has potential to spread confusion to areas of
knowledge distant from the original contradiction. Thread memory provides
an environment where one can limit the depth of deduction, while still not
compromising ultimate system capabilities. (However one may require,
"helping questions" instead).
In many cases, the same or similar information can be represented
either by a property thread, or by a specialized-nominal. Thus we might
have (IS-A GREY-THING ELEPHANT) or (COLOR-OF ELEPHANT GREY). Although
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these represent similar information, they may well have different
computational properties. However, the system should clearly be capable of
accepting information in either form, and, possibly with the aid of
prompting questions, replying to inquiries phrased in either way.
Another important relation in the memory is the HAS relation. The HAS
properties interact with the main IS-A hierarchy in special ways. We
consider HAS as a two place operator, HAS (QUANTIFIER, NAME). ONE is a
very common case of QUANTIFIER, and that combination is frequently referred
to by just HAS-A (NAME). A node can have simultaneously many HAS
properties active; at present we simply combine them all into an unordered
list. However, the problem of providing structure to this list is very
interesting and may be essential. Each HAS property results in the
creation of a thread. This thread cannot be referenced directly, but only
by means of a NAME-CHAIN. Thus (DOG HEAD) would reference the thread
stored on the HAS list of DOG under the name HEAD. In this way, relations
can be built up between the various threads that a single node HAS. These
relations are inherited, in a parallel fashion, by any node subordinate to
the given node. For example, if (IS-A DOG SPOT), then (HAS-A HEAD SPOT)
and SPOT's HEAD is related to SPOT's other parts in a manner parallel to
how a DOG's HEAD is related to a DOG's other parts.
The QUANTIFIER in a HAS relation actually serves a purpose somewhat
more general than its name would suggest. Namely, in addition to simply
specifying how many of a given item there are, it can also contain
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association lists to HAS keys individually enumerating them (or some of
them). Thus we might have (HAS (FOUR ((TWO FRONT) (TWO REAR)) ((TWO LEFT)
(TWO RIGHT)) ((A LEFT-FRONT) (A LEFT-REAR) (A RIGHT-FRONT) (A RIGHT-REAR)))
LEGS). In general such HAS quantifier lists are not inherited en masse.
Instead, each individual term is built up as required.
In addition to forward directed reasoning, (ie, SPOT IS-A DOG,
therefore SPOT HAS-A HEAD), one would also like the HAS database to serve a
recognition function (e.g. What has a head, four legs, and is in the
garden?). HAS threads, as described, are not suitable for this purpose,
since they offer no improvement on a linear search over all known items.
Therefore we fall back on specialized nominals to perform this function.
For example we also have (IS-A FOUR-LEGGED-THING DOG), (IS-A THING-WITH-
HEAD DOG), etc. With this representation, it is much easier to intersect
the various classes efficiently.
Theoretical background and suggestions for future developernent.
Our concern in this section is to review critically some of the
alternatives that have been proposed to represent the conceptual
organization of an individual as he learns about his environment, as a part
of our effort to answer the question of how one (computer or human) learns
to represent knowledge about the environment.
There is an extensive literature about concepts, but most of it does not
seem relevant for our purpose. We are interested not in a history of
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concept representation, but rather in an attempt to offer a working model
(a. program suported by theory and applications). Our account of thread
memory was suggested by E. Warrington's results in a study [25] of patients
selected on the basis of failure to recognize or identify common objects
(visual object agnosia). Although they had no deficit in perception, or in
intellectual function as measured by I.Q. tests, their knowledge of
subordinate categories was less reliable than the knowledge of
superordinate categories. It was noticed that objects from taxonomic
categories comprising many exemplars that were differentiated only by
details presented special difficulty. For example the patients could
recognize a flower but not which particular flower, some couldn't
differentiate between fruit and vegetable etc..
Two kind of mistakes were noted: 1) the object was described in terms of
a very general category and the superordinate class was used appropriately.
(hammer - some kind of a tool). 2) Semantic errors, where the response was
an alternative item from the same category. (cat-dog).
The patients could differentiate animals from plants quite correctly,
birds from insects, but the ability to differentiate among animals on the
basis of attributes and asociations was very poor. One of the patients
with a milder deficit only made errors differentiating objects on the basis
of their attributes and not by their associations.
Warrington's motivation for suggesting that links point from the more
general to the more specific, rather then the more usual specific to
general, in a nutshell, was that the observed syndrome could be modelled by
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postulating a simple break in the thread. That is, if pointers are stored
from specific to general, a break in a pointer would result in mallard
remaining connected, for example to duck and species-of-duck, but becomming
disconnected from living, animal, and bird. A memory failure of this sort
seems highly implausible and in fact was not observed. Instead, mallard
remained connected to living, animal, and bird, for example, but became
disconnected from duck and species-of-duck. Such a failure mode seems much
more plausible.
Another attempt to deal with conceptual structures in a way which is
close to our view is E. Rosch's early work [20]. Rosch's fundamental
hypothesis is that our perception of the environment is organized around
some central foci which become prototypes for the learned categories. When
someone hears a category name like bird for example, what sort of mental
representation occurs in the memory? Is it a list of defining features of
that category, an image, a code for the category's prototype? From the
experiments that Rosch conduced in the early 70's it seems that what one
generates when one hears a category name is not a list of relevant
features, but rather the best example of a member of that category. How do
we get the prototypes? In general by ostension, or by definition, that is
built up from more simple and already known concepts. How does one
classify objects? Of the many possible levels of abstraction on which an
object can be classified there is one level which is more basic
psychologically, namely, - as the experiments show- the level at which one
can obtain the most information with the least cognitive effort. We know
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that young children or people beginning to learn a new language very
frequently use the generic concept name 'thing' instead of more specific
names. The basic level gets more specialized as the individual's kowledge
gets to be more specific and detailed. If in a mini world one can get
along by using very general concepts, in a more sophisticated world, a
large universe of discourse, too much generality can lead to ambiguity and
misunderstanding.
For reasons of economy of cognitive computation the human memory chooses
as a basic level the most inclusive level at which it is possible to
represent an image of the "best example" of the class. The " best example"
is considered to be the average member of the class. Rosch states that
natural categories have an internal structure: 'on the one hand, they have
a core meaning, which is the prototype, or the best example, and on the
other hand, they have a distance dimension which is defined by decreasing
similarity of other instances to the prototype.
It follows from a number of experiments that within a given group of
related concepts three levels of abstraction are chosen: a superordinate
category, a basic level, and a subordinate category. For example the
superordinate category of furniture has two basic-level categories: chair
and lamp, and subordinate to them are the types of chairs and lamps.
In a recent paper [15], G.Miller, following Lyons [13], introduces the
technical term "hyponymy" to represent hierarchically a group of related
concepts, such as TABLE and FURNITURE. A word B is a hyponym of a word A
if for any "x", the sentence "x is a B" entails that "x is an A". To be
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able to characterize the lexical taxonomy more fully, Miller states that
the direct hyponyms of a superordinate term constitute a contrastive set of
terms whose extensions are "mutually exclusive and whose combined extension
exaust. the extension of the superordinate term". There are hierarchies
other than hyponyms that relate nominal concepts: the part-whole relation,
locative inclusions,etc.. These hierarchies can also be characterized by
transitive asymmetric relations, as is the IS-A relation of hyponymy. We
call the set of these other relations the "complexity" type of relations,
as opposed to the "abstraction" type of relation.
Miller points out the importance of redundancy rules for concept
learning. For example when a child learns TABLE he learns whatever TABLE
shares with FURNITURE and when he then learns CHAIR, he learns whatever
CHAIR shares with FURNITURE, but now it will be easier to learn. lie
doesn't have to know explicitly by a given rule that there is a common part
between TABLE and FURNITURE, or CHAIR and FURNITURE. Redundancy is going
to play a key role in the system that we propose, and we will show in an
explicit way what its effective role is in learning as well as in
forgetting and remmehering. Lexical knowledge that conforms to the
redundancy rules is not isolated from the general conceptual system, so
usually we will find TABLE toghether with CHAIR and BED and FURNITURE,
etc.. So, for example, TABLE gets its meaning from its place in the
conceptual system. As more concepts from a related area are introduced,
learning effectiveness increases. This occurs' by means of inheritance.
That is, superordinate nodes are created from which new threads can inherit
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properties, thus obviating the necessity of relearning them.
We claim, with Miller, that this way of computing meaning maximizes
learning effectiveness. We will show also its importance'for the process
of memory rehabilitation.
In [61 ] Miller makes an interesting remark, saying that in addition to
lexical knowledge about TABLE an individual has practical knowledge, about
the function of TABLE. In other words, we can say that the memory includes
two related but distinct meanings of TABLE, one is the lexical meaning, and
the other is a more general meaning of "anything serving the function of a
TABLE". [16]. Neither account has explanatory power, but we believe that
we can explain Miller's otherwise correct intuition by representing the
conceptual structures in thread memory. If we base our representation only
on the IS-A thread, then we will not be able to take into account the
function that different instances of the same object are expected to have.
What is the functional information and how is it represented? How does
one relate perceptual (lexical) information to functional information?
Miller proposes that an identification device for an object has both
perceptual (P) and functional criteria (F), that constitute somewhat
"fuzzy" thresholds for inclusion in categories. Let us take HAMMER as an
example. Objects that satisfy both kinds of criteria are literal HAMMERS.
There are also 'figurative' HAMMERS, which satisfy only one set of
criteria. For example, an ICECREAM HAMMER looks like a HAMMER but it
cannot be used as such. It thus constitutes a "fake" HAMMER that satisfies
only the perceptual criteria. A ROCK can be used as a HAMMER, so it
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satisfies the functional criteria, but it obviously does not satisfy the
perceptual criteria. If someone can identify a HAMMER but doesn't know
what it is used for, then he will never identify a ROCK as a HAMMER. The
knowledge that is invoked to determine whether 'an object performs a given
function, results from the systematization of conclusions that an
individual has reached by practice or inferred from some theoretical
knowledge (laws of mechanics, electricity, etc.). Miller proposes that the
set (F) of functional criteria be described in modal terms of possible, and
he argues that the relevant judgments of possibility depend on the system
of practical knowledge. This is the same intuition that we had in
developing our system. To obtain a thread we make use of our common sense
knowledge. To represent the functional criteria we use the LEADS-TO and
HAS relations. We believe that what has to be given to talk about the
functionality of an instance is the concept and its uses.
In the applications we will see that in nearly all cases of aphasia
(exceptions are extremly rare) the patient is not able to name the object,
but can recognize its use (given by the functional description). For
example, in some aphasias, when the doctor shows the patient a SAW, he
recognizes that it is used TO CUT WOOD, but he cannot show how. The
patient recognizes what the use of the. SAW is but he doesn't remember how
to use it. In the same time when he is asked to pick up the object that is
used to CUT WOOD, he picks up the SAW. The same is true in the case of
children learning a new concept; they learn what it is for, what purpose
it serves, and then later on, they learn how to use it. It seems to us
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that the relation between a concept and its use is a fundamental one, but
it has not been the focus of our research yet. We will outline anyway some
preliminary ideas that remain to be worked out in the future. We make the
hypothesis that if nominal concepts were not linked to their USE, then it
would be very unlikely that an individual could cope with the environment.
The hierarchy of USES is structured by LEADS-TO, and the top-down
orientation of the pointer requires that USES inferred from the input be
connected to the USES already existing in the individual's memory system.
The way in which we envision this association of USES and CONCEPTS is
as: (LEADS-TO (USE A TO-B) R), which .4ives the thread (R LEADS-TO) USE ->
A -> TO-B. If we input (USE C TO-B), we will obtain in the same way (R
LEADS-TO) USE (A & C) TO-B etc.. Eventually we will get a set of concepts
that have the same use. If we express USES as RULES in LISP for example,
then they consist of two parts: a condition and an action. If the
condition of a rule is fulfilled then the 'action is executed. The
conditions play the role of minicontexts, that is, restrictive or
sinequanon conditions, for the performance of actions.
The question arises, what is it that we associate with the USES? Thread
memory represents concepts by a general thread which is a set of simple
threads that have the same key- the concept in question. Obviously we
don't associate with the goals every single thread of the general thread.
What we do instead, is to have a 'stereotype thread', which represents the
'stereotype meaning' of the concept in question. The notion of 'stereotype
meaning' was introduced by Putnam [17]. A stereotype meaning is a set of
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beliefs associated with terms. The need for stereotypes is not primarily
to fix the extension of a term, but for discussion, for communication. As
Putnam puts it [18], " the language is not only used to verify and falsify
and classify; it is also used to discuss". The amount of information
contained in 'meanings ' varies with the nature of the information, the
kind of concept, the speaker's experience, etc..
The fact that a feature is included in the stereotype associated with a
concept doesn't necessarily mean that all the instances of that concept
have that feature, nor that all the normal instances have the feature.
Most stereotypes capture the information relevant to the paradigmatic
members of a class, but that may not always be the case. The information
contained in the stereotype is not necessarily correct, since it may happen
that a concept has been acquired incorrectly. Putnam gives as an example
the stereotype of GOLD which contains the feature 'yellow', because the
gold that we see has the color yellow even though pure gold is nearly
white. A stereotype, in other words, is built from the frequency of a
feature in instances rather than from analytic truths about it. Stereotype
are used to communicate information and to understand and convey meaning.
We believe Putnam's intuition is correct, but he offers little beyond this
intuition. He gives no mechanism for effectively obtaining the 'stereotype
meaning' of a term, and he doesn't show how a stereotype can be compatible
with the cases it contradicts. For example,how the stereotype of a tiger
which is a feline, of certain size, has black stripes, etc.., can get along
with an instance of tiger which is unstriped?. What Putnam tells us is
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that it is possible, to see tigers without stripes and still to accept them
as tigers.. lie also tells us that if we discover that the stereotype was
based on incorrect informtion we don't get a logical contradiction. If
tigers ceased to have stripes, they wouldn't be tigers any less than
before. How does one changes the 'stereotype meaning of a term? Putnam
doesn't provide us with any procedure, but certainly it wasn't his
intention to do so. (The aim of the philosophers is different from ours.
They don't SOLVE problems, they POINT OUT problems. They make observations
anti hypotheses and link them in coherent systems, or theories).
We propose to implement stereotypes by means of a bundling
mechanism applied to entire concepts, rather than by an explicit stereotype
data structure. In other words, when the stereotype of a concept is
desired, it is produced by starting at the "top" of the concept thread
structure, and following the "thickest" bundle down to some instance of the
concept, which then serves as the desired stereotype. The concept itself
thus serves as a base from which to generate the stereotype, and there is
no need for a separate data structure [9],[22].
Proceeding in this way has important advantages. First, it is in
accord with the general principle that it is best to avoid local
conventions with global consequences. If we had a data structure of some
sort specifically for sterotypes, that data structure would of necessity
have to be updated, at least in some cases, when a new instance of the
concept was encountered. That, in turn, would constitute an undesirable
global consequence, since it would involve diverting attention to the
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general issue of stereotypes, and away from the issue at hand, to which
stereotypes might or might not be relevant. We claim, moreover that it is
exceedingly difficult to learn this kind of behavior. In order to insure
correct operation, there would have to be a set of conventions which say
that when certain kinds of instances are encountered, the sterotype is
updated in such and such a way, etc. These conventions must be formulated
and debugged, and it is very hard to see exactly how to do this. Second,
one would very likely be driven to introduce additional data structure for
statistical purposes, so as to keep track, for example, of whether this is
the first "stripless tiger" we have seen or whether maybe we really had the
wrong impression and the sterotypical tiger is really stripless. Any such
data structure would merely compound the difficulties mentioned above.
Using the bundling idea, we get a entirely different and much brighter
picture. When encountering a new instance of a concept, we merely add it
in the usual way. There is no non-local computation, and in particular,
none having to do with sterotypes. Moreover, the thread memory itself
serves the statistical function. After we see enough stripless tigers as
compared to striped ones, the bundle leading to stripless tigers will
become thicker than the one leading to striped tigers, and the sterotypic
tiger will change. Note that the mechanism will in no way be "aware" at
the time it sees the critical stripless tiger that a change in its
stereotypic concepts is occurring. Instead, the next time a sterotypic
tiger is palled for, it will simply turn out to be stripless instead of
striped.
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Applications of thread memory.
We consider the most important feature of thread memory to be its
ability to learn. What are the necessary properties of a memory that
permit learning? As Quine points out [19] one thing that is basic for the
activity of ]earning is the ability of an individual to recognize
perceptual similarities. By recognizing perceptual similarity one can
relate new episodes to past episodes. In order to do that, Quine argues,
episodes leave traces, which preserve enough information to show perceptual
similarity between a current episode and a later one.
Perceptual similarity is charactrized by degree and strength. By
degree of perceptual similarity we understand the degree in which an
episode is similar to an other episode. In other words, we say that "A is
more similar to B than. A is similar to C", where A and B are. already
perceived episodes. The trace of a past episode fluctuates in strength,
where strength is related to the possibility to reactivate a trace. Traces
tend to wear out with time, but they can be strenghtened by repetition, we
are reminded of past episodes by similarities in the present.
Differences in degree of similarity must be explicit in the individual's
learning pattern. Perceptual similarity varies with the individual but the
same time, as Quine claims, it has a degree of objective validity because
of its innatnes. An individual's inductive expectations are reached by
extrapolating along lines of perceptual similarity: similar experiences
are expected to lead to similar results.
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We have focused our attention, first, on the learning of nominal
concepts from children's reading books and second, on the rehabilitation of
patients with anomia.
We restrict our applications to the semantic level of the language,
accepting the hypothesis that the various levels of language are
autonomous. As Jakobson puts it, this autonomy
doesn't mean isolationism; all levels are interrelated.
Autonomy doesn't exclude integration, and even more -- autonomy
and 'integration are closely linked phenomena. But in all
linguistic questions and especially in the case of aphasia, it is
important to approach the language and its disruption in the
framework of a given level, while remembering at the same time
that any level is what the Germans call das Teilganze and that
the totality and the interrelation between the different parts of
the totality have to be taken into account. Here very often
linguists commit a dangerous error, namely, they approach certain
levels of language with the attitude of heteronomy (colonialism),
rather than of autonomy. They treat one level only from the
point of view of another level." [12]
At the present we don't deal with the aquisition of grammar, or
with its analog, syntactic aphasia, nor do we take the phonological level
into consideration.
Learning nlominal concepts.
It has been shown by several researchers that children first learn one
word sentences, then phrases such as "blue sky" and "little boy", and
finally learn subject and predicate construction. As Jakobson points out
[11], the acquisition of such a construction is agenuine mental and verbal
revolution. Only when the child is able to use the subject and the
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predicate in relation, the spontaneous use of language begins. With the
first nouns that a child uses, there is supposed to be assiociated a
"psychological predicate", such as "see", or "give", etc. When a child
sees a cat and says "cat" or wants an apple and says "apple", the
"psychological predicates" "see " and "give" are assumed to be implicit in
his utterance. Only after the child learns some nominal concepts, from his
everyday environment, does he begin to learn verbal categories.
The corpus of examples we have used consists of children's primers. The
reasons for this choice are the following:
(1) the concepts that primers contain are very simple; one doesn't need
much previous knowledge to be able to learn them.
(2) The domain is open-ended. That is, we have extensive materials
available which lead to grade school readers, etc.
(3) The input stimuli are mainly simple words, which are easily input to
the computer. However, the books also have pictures whose inputting
presents technical problems. Usually, examples can be chosen so that the
pictures are relatively unimportant. In many cases the older sort of
primer, which tends to be fairly self contained, may be more suitable for
this purpose than the more modern ones which attempt to build upon the
child's life experience to a greater extent.
How does the computer proceed to learn nominal concepts? It observes
that a certain class of words, DICK, JANE, and SPOT, for example, may occur
in certain positions relative to other words. Moreover, observes that
Lucia Vaina
Version of September 5, 1979
words in this class have certain common features. If an unknown word
appears in a context in which a "noun" is expected, the system can guess
that this word is a "noun", and assign it properties which are common to
"nouns". This sort of concept is not limited to parts of speech. If the
computer observes that something which IS-A person appears in a certain
context, a concept may be formed exactly as before.
How does the computer go about noticing these regularities? We start by
inputting some sentences from small children's speech, or from their very
first books, as LEADS-TO threads on S (for sentence). For example:
(LEADS-TO (SEE DICK RUN) S) is typed in as text. This results in the
thread (S LEADS-TO) SEE -) DICK -> RUN being formed in the computer.
We then input (SEE JANE RUN) in the same manner, resulting in a similar
simple thread being added. We obtain
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -) DICK -) RUN
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -) JANE -> RUN
At this point, a generalized thread optimization method, called
"collapsing the bubble", can come into play. As it stands, the fork point,
the point where the two simple threads start to differ, is immediately
below the root. Both simple threads, however, have the same first token,
namely SEE. In such a case, collapsing the bubble means rearranging things
so that both simple threads share a single pointer to SEE, and the fork
occurrs below that node. We will have then
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -> DICK -> RUN
SEE -> JANE -) RUN
Lucia Vaina
Version of September 5, 1979
In a similar fashion, the combining fork can be moved up resulting in
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -> DICK -) RUN
-> JANE ->
The structure is now a "one token bubble", which triggers micro-concept
formation. We obtain then:
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -> Cl -> RUN
(Cl EXAMPLE-OF) -> DICK
(Cl EXAMPLE-OF) -) JANE and following additions to other threads,
DICK -> Cl -> DICK
JANE -> Cl -> JANE
In sum, this says that in the particular context of SEE xxx RUN, the
tokens DICK and JANE may be used interchangably. Later, if other words are
seen in the context of SEE xxx RUN, they may be added to the microconcept.
Of course the context doesn't have to be verbalized in the case of a small
child, but can occur as a "pshychological predicate".
As the system processes other sentences, it may well notice other
contexts in which DICK and JANE are used interchangably, this will result
in other microconcepts similar to Cl. What we need now is a mechanism by
which similar microconcepts can be recognized and grouped. It would be
most undesirable, however, to forcibly identify two microconcepts as
identical a.t a single moment in time. Doing so might well prove to be
erroneous, and recovery from such an error might be very difficult.
Instead, we seek a mechanism whereby then can gradually become more and
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more closely associated. The first step in providing such a mechanism is
called micro-generalization. Roughly, this process consists of locating
shared superordinate classes of the available exemplars of the micro-
concept. In our example of SEE xxx RUN, the main micro-generalization we
are aiming for turns out to be something like ANIMATE-OBJECT. However, it
is quite acceptable and in fact desirable to bring over other shared
superordinate nodes such as PHYSICAL-OBJECT, HUMAN-BEING, etc. Each
superordinate node "brought over" is placed on the ((concept> EXAMPLE-OF)
thread in the same relative position it had in the IS-A thread of the
exemplar. The usual thread memory operations of bundling, and collapsing
the bhubble are then allowed to operate. Note that it is not necessary that
all exemplars of a microconcept share a superordinate category for it to be
"brought over". Micro-generalization does not necessarily occur
"synchronously" with anthing else, in particular, it is not necessarily
synchronous with "conscious" activity. Instead, certain rates and policies
are defined, and nodes "migrate" in accordance with these regardless of
what storage or retrieval operations are taking place in the thread memory.
Given the three examples (SEE DICK RUN), (SEE JANE RUN), and (SEE SPOT
RUN), the microconcept exemplar thread, after some time, might look like
this.
(Cl EXAMPLE-OF)
-> PHYSICAL-OBJECT[3] -> ANIMATE-OBJECT[3] ->
- > HUMAN [2] -> BOY[l] -> DICK
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- > GIRL[l] -> JANE
-> DOG [1] -) SPOT
(The numbers in brackets are the thickness of the relavent strands).
By treating every context of every word as a separate micro-concept, we
clearly achieve great generality. The actual learning process would be
very painful if it were necessary to rederive from scratch all knowledge
about a word each time it was seen in a new surface context. To avoid
this, we define a measure of closeness between concepts called neighbor-
ness. The idea is that if the desired information can not be found from
the micro-concept at hand, it can be "borrowed" if necessary from a closely
neighboring concept. If the result. proves acceptable, the neighbor-ness of
the two concepts can be further reinforced; if it leads to a gaffe, it can
be inhibited. In all cases we retain the ultimate capability to rebuild
the concept completely from scratch, if necessary. Note that neighborness
need not be an absolute measure; we need only decide which of two micro-
concepts is nearer to a third.
The suggestion for a neighbor-ness measure is motovated by the bundling
analogy. We visualize the simple threads of an EXAMPLE-OF thread layed out
as if they were strands of a frayed string. A large bundle leaves the
SEMI-ROOT, dividing into smaller and smaller sub-bundles until the end
consists of the individual strands, fully separated. Taking three such
EXAMPLE-OF threads, we proceed from SEMI-ROOT, considering each segment by
segment. We consider the existance of mutual segments and the thickness of
those mutual segements are the primary factors contributing to neighbor-
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ness. For example, suppose we are now presented with the sentences (DICK
IS A BOY), (JANE IS A GIRL) and (SPOT IS A DOG). Suppose further that we
manage to microconceptualize BOY, GIRL and DOG, such that we are left with
DICK, JANE, and SPOT forming single-token bubbles, and thus they get micro-
conceptualized into some microconcept C2, which would subject to the
process of micro-generalization, and might very well become a copy of the
micro-concept CI presented above.
Rehabilitation of patients with traumatic aphasia.
Our interest is focused exclussively on the aphasia resulting from brain
damage in people who previously have used language normaly. The good
recoveries in severe cases of aphasia are rare.
It, is very likely that aphasics have a reduced set of words available for
communication, or perhaps a reduced access to a preserved set.[ll] Thus
difficulties in naming as well as in word-finding are common
characteristics of aphasic syndromes. This selective impairement is
generally called anomia, and the syndrome that is characterized by it,
amnesic aphasia though various authors also give it different names. For
example Head calls it "nominal aphasia" and Wepman to it as "semantic
aphasia". Anomia presents some of the most difficult problems faced by
doctors and therapists attempting to restore speech in patients with
traumatic aphasia [24]. An important part of this entreprise is to try to
restore the stability of memory. No other task in the treatment of sensory
aphasia is so difficult as restoration of the ability to rememeber words.
Lucia Vaina
Version of September 5, 1979
Patients show severe impairment in the ability to recall words even long
after they have regained the ability to understand others people speech.
Their active speech continues to be restricted by an amnesic type of
disorder.
In the following, using thread memory, we provide a simple model of anomic
aphasia and give some suggestions about the way in which damaged memory
recovers. We believe that loss of memory, in the case of anomic aphasia,
is in large part due to the inhability of the patient to perform certain
operations such as: accessing a thread, when the key is given. To recover
from this lnss he has to perform other operations that lead eventually,
when combined, to the same result: retrieving the meaning of the word.
What happens in the aphasic's memory? We use the thread memory as an
explanatory model and as corpus of data patients that were presented at the
Aphasia Rounds at the Boston Veterans Administration Hospital (VAH) in June
1979, with some examples from the literature as well. From the cases
presented at the VAH we can see that there is some residual verbal material
that is left in the aphasic's memory, so, the patient's ability to speak
can be unlocked through the use of certain paradigms. This remark is
consistent with our suggestion that in a thread memory concepts are
represented by general threads rather than by simple threads. The
information about each concept is represented by a set of threads each of
them supposed to end in the key, which is the concept represented. We
postulate that an individual recognizes a concept if he can access its
general thread, or at least the needed simple complete thread. By a
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complete thread we mean a thread that ends in a node identical to its key.
In a normal memory all the simple threads constituting a general thread are
complete. In the case of aphasia the threads can be are broken, they don't
end in the key [24]. To get the patient to access the right complete
thread is a hard task for a therapist. In an experiment done at the VAH,
the patient J.J. with a global aphasia, was shown a set of objects: a
ball, a tooth brush, a wallet, a lock. When asked which object was the
ball he pointed at the lock, when asked what children use to play with he
muimnmbled that he didn't know, when asked what jumps on the floor, he
pointed at the ball. Thread memory can explain these results, if we assume
that the general thread "ball" was damaged, but some simple threads in it.
were left intact. The patient was unable to recognize all the
characteristics of the object, but if the therapist happened to ask "the
right question" that is, one that input an intact thread, then the patient
answered correctly. This provides support for the hypothesis that concepts
are stored as general threads and not as simple threads. We have defined a
general thread as being a set of threads that are pointed to by the same
key.
Other data collected at the VAH or represented in the literature
[41],24] show that patients may memorize a word, but then forget it very
quickly, even repeating it several times.
A way which we think that could lead to a fixation of generalized verbal
image is by using a given key on a general thread. The advantage of using
a general thread instead of a simple thread is that the patient accesses at
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one time a variety of association with a particular key, and on the basis
or these associations can recall words much more dependably in context than
by their simple memorization. In this use of our proposed model of memory
the advantage of having the pointers oriented from the more general to the
more specific becomes clear. In bottom up models of memory it would be
difficult to access the more specific information.
In thread memory we express a general thread in the following way:
BOY -> LIVING THING -> PERSON -> MALE -> BOY
BOY -> MALE -> STUDENT -> BOY
BOY -> STUDENT -> BLOND HAIR -> BOY
BOY -> PERSON -> SON -> BOY
BOY -> LIVING THING -> CHILD -> BOY
etc..
Through the common key one can access information from any simple
thread, by making selections. In the case of brain damage if cognitive
functions, such as making selections, are impaired, the only way to
perceive cognitively the symbol accessed by a key is to get one of the
intact simple threads activated. An aphasic may very well not recognize
that 'a boy is a son', but at the same time recognize that 'a boy is a
child'. We have evidence that after a thread is accessed, the patient is
able to uie the knowledge associated with that thread, or with the part of
it that is left intact.
For example, at the VAH, the patient F.B. with a Wernicke aphasia, was
asked to show parts of his body, as pointing at his nose, etc... He
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pointed instead at his knee. We would model this in thread memory as
follows:
NOSE -> PART- OF- BODY -> PART- OF- THE FACE -> NOSE
NOSE -> HUMAN -> PART-OF BODY -> NOSE etc..
The hint that the question refers to "part of body" was given to the
patient, so he activated the threads containing it, but leading to a wrong
semantic node: "knee", instead of "nose" An other example is the
following: the therapist asked the patient J.K. to point at the window,
or at the door. He didn't understand the question. When the same question
was repeated more in detail: ."I will ask you to show me some objects in
this room", and then "show me the window", or "show me the door", the
answers were correct. In the case of J.K. he could answer correctly only
at one qustion at the time. For example in response to the question "Show
me the window and then show me the door", he pointed at the first object
correctly and then totaly forgot about the second. How can we explain that
with thread memory? First by knowing a more general node (e.g. part of
body), and the key, it is sure that the patient if he is capable at all to
understand the.question, will access the right thread or a neighbor thread
(e.g. instead of "nose", "knee"). By neighbor threads [24] we mean threads
that have in common beside the general nodes (as thing, living thing,
animal, etc..), more particularizing nodes (as part-of-body, or object-in-
room, object-to-use a kitchen),etc.. We can talk about degrees of
neigborhood between threads depending upon the number of nodes that they
have in common, or in otherwords depending upon the depth of the fork-
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point. This gives us evidence that there is rather a top-down orientation
of the pointers in a thread
Another example in the support of the hypothesis of the top down
orientation of the pointers, is the following: at the VAH, the patient SM
very aphasic, was shown a list of words: LAKE, POND, STREAM, WATER. He
was asked to point at POND and STREAM, but in both cases pointed at WATER.
The question was whether he understood that both elements were composed of
water ? Then he was given the list: SOW, POND, AXE, DESK and he was asked
again to point at POND. In this case his answer was corect. He gave the
correct answer, to the questions: WHICH ONE IS A BODY OF WATER?, and WHICH
ONE IS A FAT PIG? It is pretty clear that the patient MS understood the
meaning of the words written on the list, but that again, he didn't have
the complete thread. He had something like
POND -> ... -> WATER
STREAM -> .. -> WATER
instead of
POND -> .. -> WATER -> .. -> POND
where POND and STREAM in the first place, at the beggining of the thread
are the verbal stimuli. Each time the patient accessed the right key,
because he got the same meaning. The threads were broken after a certain
level, so the patient could not get the specific name that normaly is
stored as the last element of the thread, and coincides with the key by
which the thread is accessed. The patient was asked to look again at the
list SOW, POND, AXE, DESK, and to point at the word that is the most
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similar to LAKE. Correctly he pointed at POND, an act which suggests that
he knew the meaning of words and was able to recognize similarities. This
capacity is essential in learning or relearning (which is the case in
memory rehabilitation in aphasia).
A number of writers [4] on aphasia have noted that a patient who is
unable to recognize isolated words is often able to recognize their meaning
if they occur in the context of other words. So for example a patient who
is unable to name an object can sometimes recall the name by producing a
sentence in which the name appears. So, if he cannot name the word BOY, he
may be able to recall it by saying " see girl play ..see boy play", "girls
run .. boy run". This compensatory mechanism is made possible by the fact
that while the aphasic loses the ability to produce isolated words, which
is to associate a key with a thread , he still retains larger, familiar
speech patterns which are organized by the LEADS-TO link. The idea is that
the patient conserves some patterns, that could be typed in as
(LEADS-TO (SEE iIRL PLAY) 8)
resulting in the following thread in the computer
(S LEADS-TO) SEE -> GIRL -> .PLAY
Knowing that BOY and GIRL belong to the same paradigm, the patient will
then say correctly: SEE BOY PLAY, which is obtained from the remembered
pattern and the known paradigm obtained initially by 'collapsing the
bubble'. (We have seen that by this operation one obtains micro-concepts,
which are sets of tokens that can, be used interchangeably in the same
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context). Usually, in some cases of aphasia, the patients can trigger the
rest of the paradigm by having an example activated.
Another case where thread memory organization can be proved useful, is in
explaining those types of aphasia in which the patients manifest
difficulties in memorizing the meaning of individual words, but they have
fewer difficulties in memorizing lists of related words. We believe that
in the case of a memory organized as thread memory is, a charting path
through a search space can help to restore the meanings of words. The
search space is a whole chunk of threads that satisfy certain properties.
The charting path results from experience and, in general, represents some
sterotyped activity. The aphasic recalls the experience, which has been
repeated many times, and then he names a single word. In an experiment
done at the VAN, the patient BF, who had a very severe Wernicke aphasia ,
was shown a set of objects: a COMB, a BELL, a RAZOR, a SAW, a HAMMER. He
was asked to name them but he was completely unable to do so; asked what
the use was of some of this objects his answers were reasonably correct.
He could remember the functions of the objects but not their name.
Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that the nature of a theory depends on the questions it
is designed to answer. The thrust of our research is consistent with the
recent trends in cognitive science which focus on the modelling of cerebral
mechanisms by which concepts are assimilated, stored, retrieved and
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combined. Research to verbal learning, lexical semantics, natural language
processing has brought out a great deal about the development and mental
structure of concepts, but without contributing materially how storage,
utterance, retrieval, etc..come about. By modelling the acquisition of
concepts in children, we can learn about the source of their language
difficulties and how this difficulties can be met. The study of cognitive
processes in brain damaged patients is an opportunity both for important
theoretical work and for direct application of significant theoretical
results to practical problems of rehabilitation. Extensive experimentation
and theoretical ananlysis is called for in terms of both children's
concepts learning and brain damaged patients regaining the ability of
language comprehension and language production. A great deal has already
been done (see [24] for a survey), but it is fair to say that the most
important work lies ahead of us.
Notes
0) We wish to thank W. A. Martin, Norman Geshwind, Marvin Minsky, Harold
Goodglass, David McDonald, Henry Lieberman and Edgar Zurif for their very
meaningful comments of the first version of this paper and for encouraging
us to pursue our research.
1) The actual program, SEMI, developed by Richard Greenblatt runs on the
LISP MACHINE at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT. At this
stage of its existence the program is able to conceptualize nominals, to
answer questions about them, to make deductions and to remember them.
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